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Price-Based vs. Quantity-Based Environmental Regulation under Knightian Uncertainty: 
An Info-Gap Robust Satisficing Perspective 
 
1. Introduction 
Environmental regulations are chosen in a world in which authorities have only imperfect 
information about the underlying benefits and costs of environmental control. In his seminal 
paper, Weitzman (1974) provides guidance for the optimal choice between price-based and 
quantity-based emissions control (i.e., an emissions tax vs. a competitive market for transferable 
emissions quotas) that has become conventional wisdom among environmental policy scholars 
and practitioners. Weitzman shows that when the marginal benefits and marginal costs of 
emissions control are linear (at least to a local approximation), when authorities are uncertain 
about the intercepts of these functions (but not their slopes), and when the benefits and costs of 
emissions control are uncorrelated, then a price-based regulation is more efficient than a 
quantity-based regulation if slope of the marginal cost function is greater than the absolute value 
of the slope of the marginal benefit function, and a quantity-based regulation dominates if the 
inequality is reversed.1 This decision criterion is determined from a comparison of expected 
social welfare (expected benefit minus cost) under the two types of regulations. 
                                                 
1 Weitzman (1974) demonstrates that this decision criterion must be modified when benefits and 
costs are correlated. See Stavins (1996) for a further exposition of this case. Weitzman, Laffont 
(1977), and Malcomson (1978) examine modifications to the relative-slopes criterion when these 
are also uncertain. Linearity to a local approximation of the marginal benefit and marginal cost 
functions is also important for the determination of the prices vs. quantities criterion. Malcomson 
(1978) and Weitzman (1978) reexamine Weitzman’s original work when local linear 
approximations to the benefit and cost function are not appropriate. In our paper, we stick to 
linear marginal benefit and cost functions with uncorrelated uncertainty in their intercepts, 
because it is this problem that drives the conventional wisdom of environmental economists 
about the choice between emissions taxes and aggregate abatement standards (Baumol and 
Oates, 1988).  In fact, many recent contributions to this literature (e.g., Hoel and Karp, 2002; 
Moledina et al., 2003; Montero, 2002; Quirion, 2004) assume linear marginal benefit and cost 
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Weitzman, as well as the small army of scholars who have contributed to the prices vs. 
quantities debate since 1974, assumed that uncertainty about the marginal benefit and cost 
functions could be completely characterized by known probability distribution functions over the 
errors in estimates the marginal benefit and cost functions.2 Indeed, the criterion for choosing 
between price-based and quantity-based regulations is determined from a comparison of 
expected social welfare under the two regulatory instruments. While it has proven useful to 
assume that the error structures of estimates of the marginal benefit and cost functions are 
known, in many cases if not most, environmental authorities must design control policies even 
when they are not confident of the error structures. That is, the world of environmental 
decisionmaking may be usefully characterized by Knightian uncertainty in which, not only are 
the benefit and cost functions unknown, but the distributions of the estimates of these functions 
are also unknown.3  
In this paper, we revisit the price vs. quantity debate from the perspective of robust 
satisficing when the errors in the estimates of the benefits and costs of emissions control are 
completely unstructured. Info-gap decision theory (Ben-Haim, 2006) provides a useful way to 
think about the regulatory choice of emissions control instruments in the face of true Knightian 
                                                                                                                                                             
functions with only intercept uncertainty. We note that the approach we take in this paper, that of 
robust satisficing, can be applied to all of the complicating factors mentioned in this footnote.  
2 Recent contributions to the prices vs. quantities debate in the area of environmental 
management include extensions to dynamic environments (Hoel and Karp, 2002; Moledina et al., 
2003), imperfectly enforced environmental regulations (Montero, 2002), and to economies with 
pre-existing distortions from labor or capital taxes (Quirion, 2004). 
3 Knight was concerned "with situations which are far too unique, generally speaking, for any 
sort of statistical tabulation to have any value for guidance. The conception of an objectively 
measurable probability or chance is simply inapplicable." This is what Knight called "true 
uncertainty" (Knight, 1921, pp.231-232), and it dominates many economic policy decisions 
because local or firm-specific details and future contingencies are poorly understood by policy-
makers. 
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uncertainty.4 The heart of info-gap analysis is the pursuit of decisions that maximize the range of 
uncertainty about model parameters or functions within which the decisionmaker is certain to 
achieve a specified performance criterion. One decision is more robust than another if the range 
of uncertainty under which the performance criterion is met is larger.5 In our case, uncertainty is 
about the true values of the intercepts of the marginal benefits and costs of emissions control and 
the performance criterion is to hold the loss associated with error in the estimates of these values 
to be no greater than some value. For a given loss associated with estimation error, one emissions 
control policy is more robust than another if the range of error in the estimates of the benefit and 
cost functions under which the performance criterion is met is larger.   
  We apply info-gap analysis to the choice between price-based and quantity-based 
environmental regulation in the conventional model of environmental control under uncertainty. 
The main result of this paper is that the same criterion involving the relative slopes of the 
marginal benefit and cost functions that Weitzman derived in the case of structured uncertainty 
about the estimates of the benefit and cost functions also reveals whether price-based or quantity-
based regulation is more robust to this uncertainty when it is completely unstructured. Although 
we come to the same decision criterion, our motivation for deriving this criterion is very 
                                                 
4 Info-gap decision theory has been applied to a wide variety of problems, including financial 
risk assessment (Ben-Haim, 2005), search behavior in animal foraging models (Carmel and Ben-
Haim, 2005), policy decisions in marine reserve design (Halpern et al., 2006), natural resource 
conservation decisions (Moilanen et al., 2006), inspection decisions by port authorities to detect 
terrorist weapons (Moffitt et al., 2005a) and invasive species (Moffitt et al., 2005b), 
technological fault diagnosis (Pierce et al., 2006) and engineering model-testing (Vinot et al., 
2005). 
5 Info-gap robust-satisficing is a quantitative combination of Knightian uncertainty with Simon's 
concept of bounded rationality. The robust-satisficing policy-maker seeks a decision which 
satisfices the performance and is robust to uncertainty. Simon (1983) stresses the importance of 
satisficing—doing good enough; meeting critical requirements—when decisions must be made 
with deficient or erroneous information (i.e. Knightian uncertainty) and limited computational 
resources. 
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different. While the decision criterion for choosing between price-based and quantity-based 
emissions control maximizes the expected net social benefits of emissions control, we show that 
this decision criterion also leads to the choice of policy that is most robust to estimation error 
when authorities do not have reliable information about the probability structure of this error. 
Hence, we provide a further justification for the use of the relative-slopes criterion that is 
conventional wisdom among environmental economists—not only does this criterion lead to the 
policy that maximizes the expected net benefits of control under structured uncertainty, it also 
leads to the policy that maximizes robustness to unstructured uncertainty. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In the next section we lay out the structure of 
the info-gap approach to choosing between a price-based and a quantity-based environmental 
regulation under true uncertainty. In the third section we calculate the robustness to uncertainty 
of each policy type.  In the fourth section we derive the condition under which the price approach 
is more robust to uncertainty than the quantity approach, and vice versa, and discuss the policy 
significance of our findings. We conclude in the fifth section.  
 
2. Info-Gap Robust-Satisficing 
2.1 Info-gap uncertainty about the benefits and costs of pollution control 
Let q denote aggregate reduction (abatement) in the emissions of some pollutant. The aggregate 
benefits and costs of abatement take on the familiar quadratic forms. The benefit and costs 
functions are, respectively:  
2( ) / 2B q bq B q′′= − ;     [1] 
   ,     [2] 2( ) / 2C q cq C q′′= +
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where  are all positive constants, restricted to guarantee that optimal abatement 
levels are strictly positive throughout.
,  ,  ,  and b c B C′′ ′′
6 The social welfare function is simply the difference 
between the benefits and costs of abatement: 
   . [3] 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) / 2W q B q C q b c q B C q′′ ′′= − = − − +
We assume that the quadratic forms for the benefit and cost functions and the numerical values 
of  and B C′′ ′′  have been verified, but that the values of b and c are highly uncertain. Note that b 
and c are the intercepts of the marginal benefit and marginal cost functions, respectively. Thus, 
this set-up is consistent with most of the literature on the prices versus quantities debate, in 
which it is typical to assume that the marginal benefit and cost functions are known except for 
uncertainty about their intercepts.  
Assume that the environmental authority possesses estimates of the intercepts of the 
marginal benefit and cost functions, denoted b  and , but the factors that modify these 
parameters are complex and poorly understood, so we face true Knightian uncertainty:  no 
reliable probabilistic model is available for the size of the estimation errors. That is, we must 
deal with the uncertainty in the estimates of these parameters without knowledge of the 
probability distribution functions that underlie them. Instead, we describe the uncertainty in the 
estimates of b and c with a fractional-error info-gap model for uncertainty in  and , which is 
the following unbounded family of nested sets of the marginal functions: 
? c?
b? c?
( , , ) ( ) ,  ( ) :  ,   ,  0.b b c cU b c B q b B q C q c C q
cb
α α⎧ ⎫− −⎪ ⎪′ ′′ ′ ′′= = − = + ≤ ≤ ≥⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
? ?? ? ? ? α α
                                                
 [4] 
 
6 Strictly speaking the abatement cost function is the minimum abatement cost function. 
Implicitly, we assume that abatement responsibilities are allocated among the pollution sources 
to minimize the aggregate costs of achieving each level of aggregate abatement. This can be 
achieved with an emissions tax or with a competitive tradable emissions permit policy.  
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It is clear that α  represents the unknown fractional error in the estimates of the intercepts of the 
marginal benefit and cost functions. When the horizon of uncertainty, α , is zero, then the true 
intercepts, b and c, precisely equal the estimated values, b  and .  The range of possible 
intercept values increases as the horizon of uncertainty increases.  The horizon of uncertainty is 
unbounded, so there is no known worst case.  These properties are characteristic of all info-gap 
models (Ben-Haim, 2006). 
? c?
 
2.2 Robustness 
Generally, info-gap robustness is the greatest level of uncertainty with which a decision maker is 
certain to meet a pre-determined performance criterion. In our case, we look for the robustnesses 
of an emissions tax and an aggregate abatement standard, and our performance criterion is to 
limit the welfare loss from error in estimating the marginal benefit and cost functions. The 
emissions tax and the aggregate abatement standard are determined by maximizing the welfare 
function [3], given the best available estimates of b and c. Let the tax be t and the abatement 
quota be q , which are chosen to maximize [3] with b
?
? b= ?  and c c= ? . We will calculate and q  
in the next section.
t? ?
7 The welfare loss incurred with policy ( , )p t q∈ ?? ?
                                                
, when b and c differ from b  
and c  is denoted .  The policy maker would like low welfare loss, and therefore 
specifies  to be the largest acceptable loss.  An important result of our analysis will be to 
evaluate the reliability of attaining any specified level of loss.   
?
? ( , , )L p b c?
cL
 
7 It is worth noting that t  and  are the same price and quantity policies that are derived in 
conventional analyses of prices vs. quantities. Under the conventional approach to this problem, 
the expected values of the errors in the intercepts of the marginal benefit and cost functions are 
assumed to be zero. Maximizing expected welfare then leads to  and .  
? q?
t? q?
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 The robustness-against-uncertainty of policy p?  is the greatest horizon of uncertainty in 
the intercepts of the marginal benefit and cost functions (i.e., α ) up to which all realizations of 
these functions result in loss no greater than . Formally: cL
( ), , ,ˆ ( , ) max : max ( , , )c b c U b c cp L L p bαα α ∈
⎧ ⎫⎛= ⎨ ⎜⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭? ?
? c L⎞ ≤ ⎬⎟? .    [5] 
 For policy p? , we will demonstrate that ˆ ( , ) 0 for 0c cp L Lα = =? . This implies zero 
robustness to zero loss; that is, only zero error in the estimates of the b and c can produce zero 
welfare loss. This is true of any regulation that is based on best estimates of model parameters. 
Furthermore, we will show that ˆ ( , )cp Lα ?  is strictly increasing in Lc, which implies that greater 
robustness to estimation error is only achievable by tolerating a greater loss; that is, robustness to 
error trades off against loss, and ˆ ( , )cp Lα ?  quantifies this tradeoff.  
The main result of this paper is a determination of the relative robustness of the emissions 
tax, , and the abatement standard, . Specifically, t  is more robust to estimation error than  
if 
t? q? ? q?
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )ct L q Lcα α>? ? ; if the inequality is reversed, the abatement standard is more robust. In the 
first case, ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )ct L q Lcα α>? ?  reveals that the range of error in the estimates of the intercept of 
the marginal benefit and cost function for which an environmental authority is certain that the 
loss from error will not exceed a critical value, Lc, is greater under the emissions tax than under 
the abatement standard. Thus, the authority is more confident about limiting the loss from error 
under the emissions tax than under the abatement standard. Of course, if ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )c ct L q Lα α<? ? , then 
the authority is more confident about limiting the welfare loss from estimation error under the 
abatement standard.  
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3. Info-Gap Analysis of Price-Based vs. Quantity-Based Environmental Regulation 
In this section we derive the robustness functions for an emissions tax and an aggregate 
abatement standard, both of which are determined with the best-available estimates of the 
intercepts of the marginal benefit and cost functions and the info-gap models for uncertainty in 
those estimates. 
 
3.1 Robustness of an aggregate abatement standard 
If the intercepts of the marginal benefit and cost functions were known, the environmental 
authority would choose an aggregate abatement standard to maximize the welfare function  
  , 2( ; , ) ( ) ( ) / 2W q b c b c q B C q′′ ′′= − − +
which leads to ( ) (q b c B C∗ ′′ ′′= − + ) . However, with only its best estimates of b and c, the 
authority sets the abatement standard to maximize , and therefore, sets the abatement 
standard at 
( ; , )W q b c? ?
( ) (q b c B C′′ ′′= − +?? ? )
?
. The welfare loss when b and c differ from b  and  is 
then , which is calculated to be 
? c?
*( ; , ) ( ; , ) ( ; , )L q b c W q b c W q b c= −?
  2( ; , ) [( ) ( )] 2( )L q b c b b c c B C′′ ′′= − − − +?? ? . 
The uncertainty model [4] specifies the ranges of error in the estimates of the intercepts 
of the marginal benefit and cost functions at any horizon of uncertainty, α ; that is, 
[ ,b b b b]α α− ∈ −? ? ?  and [ , ]c c c cα α− ∈ −? ? ? . (Recall that are positive constants). The inner 
maximum of the definition of robustness [5] requires maximization of  with respect to b 
and c.  In turn, this requires either 
and  b c? ?
( ; , )L q b c?
b b bα− =? ?  and c c cα− = −? ? , or b b bα− = −? ?  and c c cα− =? ? . 
That is, for some fractional error in the estimates of b and c, α ,  is maximized with ( ; , )L q b c?
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respect to b and c if b is over-estimated and c is under-estimated, or if b is under-estimated while 
c is over-estimated. In either case,  
2 2( , ) ( ) 2( )L q b c B Cα α ′′ ′′= + +?? ? ,     [6] 
is the maximum welfare loss of  when the fractional error in the estimates of the intercepts of 
the marginal benefit and marginal cost functions is 
q?
α . 
Now, from [5], the robustness of abatement standard  is the highest q? α  for which 
( , ) cL q Lα ≤? . Since ( , )L qα ?  is monotonically increasing in α , we choose α  to satisfy 
( , ) cL q Lα =? . Solving this equation for α  provides the robustness of the abatement standard :  q?
  ˆ ( , ) 2 ( ) ( )c cq L L B C b cα ′′ ′′= + ?? + ? .     [7] 
Since are all positive constants and  is non-negative, ,  ,  ,  and b c B C′′ ′′? ? cL ˆ ( , )cq Lα ?  is non-
negative. 
The robustness function, ˆ ( , )cq Lα ? , quantifies the greatest fractional error in the estimates 
of the intercepts of the marginal benefit and marginal cost functions for which the welfare loss 
associated with the abatement standard  is not greater than some critical welfare loss Lq? c. Note 
that, with respect to Lc, ˆ ( , )cq Lα ?  has a zero intercept, is montonically increasing, and strictly 
concave. The zero intercept implies that there is zero robustness to zero loss; that is, the 
environmental authority can have no confidence in limiting the loss from estimation error to 
zero. That robustness is increasing in Lc implies that greater robustness only comes with 
tolerating a greater loss: the authority gains confidence in meeting the performance criterion as 
this criterion is relaxed. Finally, the concavity of ˆ ( , )cq Lα ?  suggests that the marginal cost (i.e., 
the marginal increase in critical loss) of attaining greater robustness is increasing.  Put another 
way, confidence in limiting the welfare loss increases with higher acceptable loss, but at a 
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decreasing rate. Robustness functions are always monotonic, expressing a fundamental trade-off 
between robustness and performance. They are not always concave. 
 
3.2 Robustness of an emissions tax 
We now turn to calculating the robustness of an emissions tax. We demonstrate that it has the 
same basic characteristics of robustness to an abatement standard. 
Firms in an industry will react to an emissions tax, t, by choosing their levels of 
abatement so that their individual marginal abatement cost functions are equal to the tax. In 
aggregate, then, the intersection of the tax and the aggregate marginal abatement cost function 
determines aggregate abatement. From t c C q′′= +  we have ( ) ( ) /q t t c C′′= − . Social welfare 
[3], in terms of an emissions tax, is then 
   2( ; , ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ( )) / 2.W t b c b c q t B C q t′′ ′′= − − +
The tax that maximizes this social welfare function is ( ) (t bC cB B C∗ )′′ ′′ ′′ ′= + + ′ . With only its 
best estimates of b and c, however, the regulatory authority chooses ( ) (t bC cB B C′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= + +?? ? ) . 
(It is easy to demonstrate that  produces t∗ q∗  abatement, and  produces  abatement).  The 
welfare loss when b and c differ from b  and  is , which is 
calculated to be 
t? q?
? c? *( ; , ) ( ; , ) ( ; , )L t b c W t b c W t b c= −? ?
  2 2( ; , ) [( ) ( ) ] 2( )( )L t b c b b C c c B B C C′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= − + − +?? ? . 
As with the abatement standard, the uncertainty model [4] specifies the ranges of error in 
the estimates of b and c, [ , ]b b b bα α− ∈ −? ? ?  and [ , ]c c c cα α− ∈ −? ? ? , at any horizon of uncertainty, 
α . In contrast to the abatement standard, however, the inner maximum of the definition of 
robustness [5] requires either b b bα− =? ?  and c c cα− =? ? , or b b bα− = −? ?  and c c cα− = −? ? . That is, 
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( ; , )L t b c?  is maximized if both b and c are over-estimated, or if both are under-estimated. In 
either case,  
2 2( , ) [ ] 2( )( )L t bC cB B C Cα α ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= + +?? ? 2 . 
Robustness of  is then the solution to at? rg max ( , ) cL q Lα α ≤? ; that is,  
  ˆ ( , ) 2 ( ) ( )c ct L C L B C bC cBα ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= + +?? ? .    [8] 
Again, ˆ ( , )ct Lα ?  is the greatest fractional error in the estimates of the intercepts of the 
marginal benefit and marginal cost functions for which the welfare loss associated with the 
emissions tax t  is not greater than some critical welfare loss L? c. With respect to Lc, ˆ ( , )ct Lα ? has 
a zero intercept, is montonically increasing, and strictly concave. Therefore, ˆ ( , )ct Lα ?  has the 
same basic structure as ˆ ( , )cq Lα ? . However, for some Lc, ˆ ( , )ct Lα ? and ˆ ( , )cq Lα ?  will normally take 
on different values.  
 
4. The Relative Robustness of Price-Based and Quantity-Based Emissions Control  
We are now able to compare the robustness of the emissions tax, , to the robustness of the 
aggregate abatement standard, . Using the robustness functions [7] and [8], calculate   
t?
q?
( ) 2 ( )ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )
( )( )
c
c c
C B c L B C
t L q L
b c bC cB
α α ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′− +− = ′′ ′′+ +
?? ? ? ?? ? .   [9] 
Clearly, the relative robustness of and  to any critical loss, Lt? q? c, depends solely on the 
relative slopes of the marginal benefit and cost functions, and .C B′′ ′′  Specifically,  is more 
robust to estimation error than  if and only if the marginal cost function is more steeply sloped 
than the marginal benefit function; that is, 
t?
q?
.C B′′ ′> ′  On the other hand, if , the 
abatement standard is more robust than the emissions tax.  Note further that the difference in the 
C B′′ ′′<
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robustness of the two policies increases as Lc increases, Thus, the value of one policy over the 
other (in terms of immunity to loss) increases as the potential loss  is allowed to increase. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the robustness functions for and q  when C
cL
t? ? B′′ > ′′  and B C′′ ′′> , 
respectively. [Place Figures 1 and 2 about here].  
The main result of this work is that the same relative-slopes criterion that Weitzman 
(1974) derived to choose between price-based and quantity-based regulation applies in our case 
as well. However, we have demonstrated a complementary purpose for this criterion. In the 
conventional case, the relative-slopes criterion provides guidance about the choice between an 
emissions tax and an aggregate abatement standard when the policy objective is to maximize 
expected welfare from emissions control when the errors in the estimates of the intercepts of the 
marginal benefit and cost functions are characterized by known probability distribution 
functions. We have shown that the relative-slopes criterion also determines which policy is more 
robust to unstructured Knightian estimation error. Therefore, our work complements the 
conventional approach to the prices versus quantities debate, because it provides a further 
justification for the relative slopes criterion. Not only will this criterion lead to the policy that 
maximizes the expected net benefits of control under structured uncertainty, it also leads to the 
policy that maximizes robustness to unstructured uncertainty.  
To illustrate the results of our work, suppose that the marginal benefit and cost parameters 
take on the following values:  In this case  and 100,  40,  1,  and 2.b c B C′′ ′′= = = =? ? 20q =? 80t =? . 
Because C B ,  is always more robust that q  (Figure 1). To verify this for allowable loss 
, use [7] to calculate 
′′ ′′> t? ?
100cL = ˆ ( , 100) 0.175cq Lα = =?  and use [8] to calculate 
ˆ ( , 100) 0.204ct Lα = =? .  That is, welfare loss from estimation error no greater than  is 
guaranteed with the tax policy if the estimated intercepts err by no more than±  20.4%. In 
100cL =
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contrast, welfare loss no greater than 100 is guaranteed with the quantity policy if the estimated 
intercepts err by no more than 17.5%. That is, the robustness premium of the tax policy is ± ±  
2.9%. For a higher allowable welfare loss, say 300cL = , ˆ ( , 300) 0.303cq Lα = =?  and 
ˆ ( , 300) 0.354ct Lα = =? . At this higher level of allowed welfare loss, the robustness premium of 
the tax policy is 5.1%.  In both of these cases, as well as any , the range of error in the 
estimates of the intercepts of the marginal benefit and marginal cost functions within which the 
welfare loss is limited to be no more than  is greater under the tax than under the abatement 
standard.  
± 0cL >
cL
We can use our hypothetical numerical example to illustrate the trade-off between 
robustness-to-uncertainty and welfare loss, expressed by the positive slopes of the curves in 
Figures 1 and 2. Whichever policy is chosen, greater robustness can only be obtained in 
exchange for greater welfare loss. Furthermore, this trade-off is evaluated quantitatively. For 
instance, a robustness of ˆ 0.2α =  corresponds to immunity to 20% error in the estimated 
intercepts, . For the tax policy, this corresponds to a critical welfare loss of .  
Pursuing greater robustness, say 40%, requires a greater critical welfare loss of .   
 and b? ?c 96cL =
384cL =
 
5. Conclusion 
We claim two contributions of this work. First, we have illustrated a policy evaluation tool, info-
gap robust-satisficing, which is an alternative to expected welfare maximization. Info-gap 
robust-satisficing is useful when errors in model parameters are unstructured in the sense that 
they cannot be modeled with known or confidently estimated probability distribution functions. 
In these cases, one cannot evaluate policies in terms of their affect on expected benefits and 
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costs. Info-gap robust satisficing requires no knowledge of underlying probability models, and 
evaluates policies on the basis of robustness to loss when uncertainty is unstructured. Our second 
contribution is that we have reinterpreted the conventional wisdom of environmental economists 
that the relative slopes of the marginal benefits and marginal costs of pollution control determine 
whether price-based or quantity-based policies should be pursued. It is conventional wisdom that 
the relative-slopes criterion leads to the policy type that maximizes the expected net social 
benefits of environmental control under structured uncertainty about social benefits and costs. 
We have shown that this criterion also leads to the policy choice that is more robust to 
unstructured uncertainty about social benefits and costs. 
 We applied the info-gap robust satisficing approach to the canonical model of 
environmental control under uncertainty that drives the conventional wisdom about prices versus 
quantities. It is well-known, however, that the relative-slopes criterion must be modified when 
there is also uncertainty in the slopes of the marginal benefit and cost functions, when the 
uncertainty in benefits and costs are correlated, when the marginal benefit and cost functions are 
nonlinear, as well as when many of the other simplifying assumptions that underlie the 
conventional model are relaxed. (See footnotes 1 and 2). The approach we take in this paper can 
easily be applied to all of these more complicated situations. We believe that doing so would be a 
fruitful area for future research, and will lead to a deeper understanding of the design of 
environmental policies under uncertainty, and possibly to different policy recommendations.  
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Figure 1: Relative robustness of 
 and  when . t? q? C B′′ ′′>
Figure 2: Relative robustness of 
 and q  when t? ? B C′′ ′> ′ . 
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